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CASE NOTES

FEDERAL COURTS--JRISDICTION-"MANUFACTURED" DIVERSITY OF
CITIZENSHIP BY WHICH AN OUT-OF-STATE GUARDIAN WAS SELECTED TO

PROSECUTE THE SUIT OF A RESIDENT MINOR, DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION. McSparran v.

Weist, 401 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
McSparran, a resident of New Jersey, was appointed guardian by the
Orphans Court of Berks County, Pennsylvania, to prosecute a personal
injury suit for a minor against the defendants. The sole purpose for
the appointment of a non-resident guardian was to create diversity of
citizenship and thus acquire jurisdiction in the federal court. This was
necessary because both the minor and the defendants were Pennsylvania
residents. The guardian instituted the claim in the federal district court
which dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.' Held-Affirmed. The district court did not have jurisdiction over the suit because "manufactured" diversity of citizenship does not constitute a proper foundation
2
to invoke federal jurisdiction.
The basis for the original grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts was the assumption by the framers of the Constitution that
state courts would be biased in controversies between local citizens and
citizens of different states. It was assumed that they would favor the
resident against the non-resident.8 This assumption was incorporated
into the Constitution,4 which provides that the federal courts shall have
original jurisdiction of suits between citizens of different states.
Problems have arisen in interpreting this area of federal jurisdiction.
In 1875, an act was passed which required dismissal or remand for lack
of jurisdiction because of improper or collusive joinder. 5 The present
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1359, provides:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been made or joined to
invoke the jurisdiction of such court. 6
The purpose of denying collusive suits was to prevent the overcrowding of federal court dockets with suits which were not within the
purview of the Constitution or Congressional acts.7 Appointment of
guardians and administrators for the sole purpose of creating or manufacturing diversity jurisdiction, is of principle interest today.
Rule 17a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
1

McSparran v. Weist, 270 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967).

2 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
8 Doub, An Old Problem: The Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 45 A.B.A.J. 1273 (1959).

4 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
5 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472.
6 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952).
7 Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly, 64 F. 401, aff'd, 160 U.S. 327, 16 S. Ct.
307, 40 L. Ed. 444 (1895).
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Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another,
or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name, without8
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought.
The Second and Third Circuits have led in allowing "manufactured"
diversity suits. If the fiduciary is a real party in interest under state law,
then diversity can be created by appointing a fiduciary of a citizenship
other than the defendant's. The theory is that an appointment made in
a state court cannot be "collusive" or "improper" within the meaning
of section 1359, because the motive for appointment is irrelevant. 9
It is not the citizenship of the incompetent, nor whether he is the real
party in interest which governs diversity, rather the citizenship of the
guardian provided he has the capacity to sue.' 0 A majority of circuit
courts have held that when an executor or administrator of an estate is
a party to an action in the federal courts, it is his personal citizenship
which will determine the diversity jurisdiction." The federal court
usually accepts the appointment as valid for federal jurisdictional pur12
poses as well as for substantive purposes.
The Third Circuit for many years has allowed the citizenship of
personal representatives or guardians to establish diversity jurisdiction. 18 Allowing diversity jurisdiction in cases when an out-of-state
representative is appointed to create federal jurisdiction is a misapplication of the diversity concept. 14 The Third Circuit, in Jaffe v. Philadelphia and Western R. Co.,5 stated that motive is irrelevant in the
artificial creation of diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction was
sustained under the Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes of Pennsylvania. The New Jersey plaintiff appointed as administratrix ad prosequendam was a stenographer in the employment of the widow's
attorney. The Court, citing Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,' 6 ruled
that the administratrix ad prosequendam was the real party in interest
and her selection did not amount to collusion under 28 U.S.C. § 1359.17
8 FED. R.

Civ. P. 17(a) (1966).

9 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §

17.05(3.-2).

10 Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).

11 See Annot. 77 A.L.R. 910 (1932), 136 A.L.R. 938 (1942), 75 A.L.R.2d 711 (1959) for
cases supporting this view.
12 Jaffe v. Philadelphia and Western R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1948), afJ'd,
180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
13 Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
14 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.05(3-3). See also Cohan and Tate, Manufacturing
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and
Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REV. 201 (1956).
15 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
16 284 U.S. 183, 52 S. Ct. 84, 76 L. Ed. 233 (1931).
17Jaffe v. Philadelphia and Western R. Co., 180 F.2d 1010, 1012-1013 (3d Cir. 1950).
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In Mecom the resignation and subsequent appointment were accomplished, not to create federal jurisdiction, but to prevent it from
attaching.' 8 Section 1359 was not applicable since "improper" and
"collusive" apply only to the invoking of diversity jurisdiction. 9
A New Jersey resident in Fallat v. Gouran20 brought suit on grounds
of diversity as the guardian of a Pennsylvania incompetent. Citizenship
of the guardian controlled in determining diversity jurisdiction rather
than that of the incompetent. 21 The court relied upon Mexican Central
Railway Co. v. Eckman22 in which the Supreme Court stated that representatives may stand upon their own citizenship in the federal courts.
The leading case in "manufactured" diversity is Corabi v. Auto
Racing, Inc., 23 wherein Judge Biggs wrote the opinion for the Third
Circuit. In Corabi, a resident administrator resigned so that a nonresident administrator could be appointed for the express purpose of
creating diversity jurisdiction. The court held that this was not collusion 24 and did not violate any statute.2 5 The court followed Black and

White Taxicab v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.,26
which reasoned that the motives inducing the creation of diversity had
no effect on the validity of the transactions which were the subject of
the suit. The motive for his appointment is irrelevant; it is enough
that the respondent is the real party in interest. 27 The administratrix
was discharged and another administrator was appointed prior to the
inception of the suit, and thus he had a valid cause of action. 28 To use
a state law to obtain diversity jurisdiction, even though the object may
be a higher verdict in a federal court, is not collusive within the ordinary meaning of that term. 29 Had Congress intended to prohibit the
creation of federal diversity jurisdiction under such circumstances as
those at bar, it could have done so simply by omitting the words "improperly" or "collusively.

' ' 30

18 Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 52 S. Ct. 84, 76 L. Ed. 233 (1931).

1962 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952).
20 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
21 Id.

22 187 U.S. 429, 23 S. Ct. 211, 47 L. Ed. 245 (1903).
23264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); 75 A.L.R.2d 711.

24 The court held that "collusion" indicates a secret agreement and cooperation for
a fraudulent purpose and to make use of a state law to obtain diversity of jurisdiction,
even though the object might be a higher verdict in a federal court.
25 Compare Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949) with McCoy v.
Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954) for opposite rulings on this issue.
26276 U.S. 518, 48 S. Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 681, 57 A.L.R. 426 (1928).

27Black and White Taxicab distinguished Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.
Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 16 S. Ct. 307, 40 L. Ed. 444 (1895) and Miller and Lux v. East
Side Canal and Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293, 29 S. Ct. 111, 53 L. Ed. 189 (1908). These
cases involved the manufacturing of diversity jurisdiction by the creation of new
corporations. They were struck down as collusive under the Act of 1875. They were
not, however, overruled by Black and White Taxicab.
28 Corabi v. Auto Racing Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
29 Id.
30 Id.
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The Second Circuit adopted the Corabi rule in Lang v. Elm City
82
Construction Companys' and Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Company.
In Lang, even though the foreign plaintiff was appointed administrator
expressly for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship, he was not
"improperly or collusively joined" to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court within the meaning of section 1359. 33 In Stephan, the appointment of the plaintiff for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship
did not require dismissal on the ground that it was improper or
8 4
collusive.
The Eighth Circuit also followed the rule of Corabi. In County of
Todd, Minn. v. Loegering,8 5 the court held there was no illusion as to
the motive which prompted the appointment of the plaintiff as trustee.
Excluding this motive in the evaluation of the charge of manufacturing
diversity jurisdiction, the court found no acts of collusion or improprieties.86 Further, in Janzen v. Goos,87 the plaintiff's motive in moving
from Nebraska to Kansas prior to bringing a wrongful death action was
immaterial in determining diversity of citizenship. 8 However, the
Eighth Circuit had previously dismissed the suit in Martineau v. City
of St. Paul39 for lack of diversity jurisdiction because the guardian was
merely an officer of the state probate court and the minor ward was the
real party in interest. They based their decision on the Minnesota law
which provides that a guardian may not maintain the action in his own
name in the state courts. 40 Thus, he could not maintain the suit in the
federal court which enforces state law and state policy in diversity
cases. 41 In Ferrarra v. Philadelphia Laboratories,42 an action was
brought by a non-resident trustee appointed primarily to create diversity jurisdiction. The defendants directly challenged the jurisdiction
of the court by alleging that the plaintiff was improperly or collusively
made a party to invoke diversity jurisdiction. It is the duty of the court
to inquire fully into the circumstances and conditions which surround
the making of the assignment or transfer, in order that it might determine whether or not jurisdictional grounds exist. 48 A case brought by
81 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1963), afj'd, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).
82 217 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn. 1963), afj'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963).
38 Lang v. Elm City Construction Co., 217 F. Supp. 873, 878 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd,
324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).
34 Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Company, 217 F. Supp. 880, 882 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd,
325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963).
85297
86 Id.
87 302
38 Id.
89

F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).
at 473.

F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962).
at 425.

172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).

40 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
41 Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).

42 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D.C. Vt. 1967), afl'd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
431d. Compare with National Surety Corp. v. Inland Properties Inc., 286 F. Supp.
173 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
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a real party in interest may nevertheless be dismissed as being collusive. 44
Judge Thornberry of the Fifth Circuit was unable to distinguish
Corabi in CaribbeanMills, Inc. v. Kramer,45 yet he chose not to follow
the principle established in it. A Texas resident was assigned the
interests of a Panamanian corporation and those of a resident of Washington, D.C. to bring suit in federal court on grounds of diversity,
against a Haitian corporation. The assignment of interests was colorable
because it did not divest the assignors of their interests in the lawsuit
and was made for the express purpose of creating diversity.46 Judge
Thornberry rejected the decisions upholding jurisdiction under similar
circumstances as undermining the historic policy of limiting diversity
jurisdiction and an unjustified departure from previous cases decided
47
by the Supreme Court.
The instant case of McSparran was argued before the court en banc
with Esposito v. Emery48 for the express purpose of reviewing the question of jurisdiction in a federal court, created by "manufactured" diversity of citizenship. This case was similar to the previous cases in that
a non-resident was appointed guardian solely to create diversity jurisdiction. This fact was conceded by the counsels for the plaintiff. 49 The

court stated that Rule 17 of the Federal rules5" focused on the capacity
to sue, but it was not determinative of diversity of citizenship. 51 Rule
8252 clarifies this by stating that the rules do not affect the jurisdiction
of the court. The principle problem under consideration was whether
to look to the citizenship of the representative, or to that of the person
he represents. The court believed that Section 37 of the Judicial Code
of 191153 should be read together with 28 U.S.C. § 1359 for the proper
interpretation of "collusive" and "improperly."5 4 Section 37 states that a
nominal party selected solely for the purpose of creating diversity of
citizenship, who has no real or substantial interest in the dispute or
controversy, is improperly or collusively named. The court reconsidered
its previous application of section 1359 in Corabi and held that it was
44 Id. at 1015. The court distinguished the Corabi and Lang cases.
45392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968) cert. granted.
46 Id. at 394.
47 Caribbean Mills Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 L.W.
3133 (1968).
48 402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Meyerhoffer v. East Hanover Township School
District, 280 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Greene v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 280
F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
49 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 869 (3d Cir. 1968).
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (1966).
51 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1968).
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (1966).
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts or the venue of actions therein.
53 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231 § 37, 36 Stat. 1087, 1098.
54 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 872-873 (3d Cir. 1968).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 1, Art. 10

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

not as limited in scope as they had previously held.5 5 They also held
that the motive for which the representative was selected could not be
ignored in ascertaining the purpose for which the representative was
appointed.5 6 Section 1359 does not ban the appointment of non-resident
fiduciaries, but the artificial selection of a representative, who has no
duty or function except to offer the use of his citizenship to invoke
federal jurisdiction, is a violation of the statute. 57 The court went on
to hold that section 1359 applies to executors and administrators as
well as guardians."8
The instant case was essentially a local controversy and the guardian
was appointed solely to create diversity. One of the underlying reasons
for diversity is missing: the prevention of discrimination against outof-state litigants.5 9 Thus the attempt to confer diversity jurisdiction
offended section 1359. The Jaffe and Corabi cases were expressly overruled and Fallat v. Gouran6" was disapproved to the extent it indicated
approval of "manufactured" diversity. 61
Judge McLaughlin dissented on the grounds that the district court
had properly confined the applicable out-of-state administrative rule
to the administrator's action and barred the joining of a non-diversity
suit as a matter of right under the cover of the administrator's claim.
He would affirm the judgment of the district court solely on that point.6 2
Judge Kalodner also dissented 8 stating that the only issue presented on
appeal was whether the district court erred in dismissing the mother's
independent claim for damages. He further adopted the reasoning of
Judge Biggs' dissent in Esposito v. Emery.6 4
In Esposito, Judge Biggs stated that his dissent was in all substantial
respects equally applicable to the majority's opinion in McSparran.65
He believed that the law was correctly decided in Jaffe, Fallat and
Corabi.The ruling of the majority was a collateral attack on the decree
of the state probate courts and as such should not be permitted.6 6 Judge
Biggs went on to state that Rule 17 of the Federal Rules as the majority
conceded, authorizes the guardian to bring the suit as the party plaintiff.6 T While purporting to abolish the "manufacture" of diversity juris55 Id. at 873.
56 Id. at 874.
57

Id. at 874-75.

58 Id. at 875.

591d. at 876.
60 220 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1955).
61 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968).
62 Id. at 877.
63 Id. at 878.
64 402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968).
65 Id. at 881. As senior Circuit Judge, Judge Biggs was disqualified from voting for a
rehearing or participating at the hearing in McSparran v. Weist, since he took no part
in the original argument in McSparran.
66 Id. at 882.
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (1966).
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diction, the majority rule would elevate such manufacturing to an art,
difficult to define, and even more difficult to combat."'
Corabi held that there is nothing collusive or improper in openly
going before a state court on a petition which is a public record and
having an out-of-state fiduciary appointed with the thought of obtaining
a larger judgment or to avoid delays in some of the state courts.6 9 This
applies with equal force in the present cases.7 Judge Biggs believes that
the majority decision will open a fertile field for perjurious testimony
71
and lead to great uncertainty.
The ruling in McSparran is significant in that the Third Circuit
overruled its own cases which were the fundamental basis supporting
the concept of "manufactured" diversity jurisdiction. Corabi has been
the leading case in diversity since its inception in 1959. The purpose of
section 1359 was to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts; yet this
purpose was crippled by the previous Third Circuit decisions.
The American Law Institute proposed several amendments72 to 28
U.S.C. § 1359 which would eliminate the problems of interpretation.
The need for this legislation is no longer imperative in light of the
McSparran case. This new interpretation of section 1359 should ease
the burden of the federal courts. Section 1359 is now performing its
function of limiting the scope of federal jurisdiction and properly
placing the burden on the state courts.
Dennis J. Healey
68 Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968).
69 Id.
70 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1968); Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878
(3d Cir. 1968).
71Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 883 (3d Cir. 1968).
72 AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE,

STUDY

OF THE DIVISION

OF JURISDICTION

BETWEEN

STATE

AND FEDERAL COURTS: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 1, APRIL 19, 1965 § 1301(b)(4) "An
executor, or an administrator, or any person representing the estate of a decedent or
appointed pursuant to statute with authority to bring an action because of the death
of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same state as the decedent: . . ."
§ 1307(a) "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party has been made or joined improperly, or collusively, or pursuant to agreement
or understanding between opposing parties, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court."; Marden, Reshaping Diversity Jurisdiction: A Plea for Study by the Bar, 54
A.B.A.J. 453 (1968); Moore and Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and
Future, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1964); criticized-Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. (1963).
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